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Book Reviews
Gideon's Trumpet. By Anthony Lewis. Random House:
New York, 1964, Pp. 262; with notes, suggested readings,
table of cases, and index. $4.95.
The Pulitzer prize winning author of this excellent
book has been with the Washington Bureau of The New
York Times since 1955, specializing in coverage of the Supreme Court, the Justice Department, and legal matters
generally. With insight, understanding and a sensitive
awareness of the Court's indispensable role in the American political process, Mr. Lewis has written a courtroom
drama of intense interest to lawyers and laymen alike. In
addition, he has woven into this drama a patient, meticulous and discerning treatise on the machinations of the
Supreme Court, giving the reader a lively sense of justice
in the making.
The extraordinary case about which this book is written
began with the arrest of Clarence Earl Gideon for breaking
and entering the Bar Harbor Pool Room in Panama City,
Florida, on June 3, 1961. On August 4, 1961, Gideon's case
was called for trial. The defendant advised the court that
he was not ready to stand trial because he did not have an
attorney and requested that counsel be appointed to represent him. The court denied his request, explaining that
under the laws of the State of Florida, the court could only
appoint counsel in capital cases. To this, Gideon replied,
"The United States Supreme Court says I am entitled to
be represented by counsel."' Gideon was clearly wrong, of
course, as the United States Supreme Court had held the
opposite in the case of Betts v. Brady2 and in succeeding
right-to-counsel cases.
The author describes Gideon as a "used up" man of fiftyone, "rather likeable, but one tossed aside by life."3 He had
been in and out of prisons, but he clearly had not given up
caring about life or freedom. On January 8, 1962, a secretary in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court received a large envelope from Gideon, containing a "Petition for Writ of Certiorari Directed to the Supreme Court
State of Florida," written in pencil on lined sheets of paper
provided by the Florida prison. Gideon said, in substance,
LEWIS, at 10.
2316 U.S. 455 (1942).
'Lwis, -at5-6.
1
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that his conviction violated the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, as he had been
tried and convicted without the aid of counsel to assist in
his defense.
Since Betts, the Court had maintained that an impoverished defendant was entitled to counsel only in certain circumstances. Gideon did not contend that he was the victim
of special circumstances, such as his own illiteracy, ignorance, youth, or mental illness. He did not contend that he
was at a disadvantage because of the complexity of the
charge against him, or the conduct of the prosecutor or
judge at the trial. He simply said he had asked for a lawyer
but his indigency prevented him from hiring one. Fortunately for Gideon, the Court decided it was time to take
a second look at the "special circumstances" doctrine. The
petition for certiorari was granted.
As Gideon had no counsel, and had made an oath that
he could not afford to employ one, the Court appointed
Abe Fortas, an outstanding Washington lawyer, to represent him. Fortas was no stranger to constitutional questions and was highly skilled in appellate practice. His interest in criminal law was reputedly more philosophical than
practical, his firm being primarily engaged in anti-trust
litigation, practice before administrative agencies, corporate counselling, and the like. He had, however, argued
and won Durham v. United States.' Gideon was indeed
fortunate when the Court entered its order appointing
Fortas to serve as counsel for petitioner.
The author gives a detailed and fascinating account of
the variety of decisions which faced Fortas in his preparation of the case. He knew that the Supreme Court would
not be unmindful of the probable consequences of reversing its position in Betts after following it for two decades.
He was well aware of Justice Felix Frankfurter's warning
that "such an abrupt innovation as recognition of the constitutional claim here . . . would furnish opportunities
hitherto uncontemplated for opening wide prison doors of
the land."5 Was this the appropriate case, and were a majority prepared to "reconsider" Betts? Should he urge upon
the Court the "special circumstances doctrine"? To what
extent should he go into the social implication of the issue
of the case?
' 214 F. 2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia adopted a broader concept of criminal insanity, holding that
"an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the
product of a mental disease or defect."
8 LEwIs, at 28.
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In his brief, Mr. Fortas argued that the right to counsel
is assured by the Fourteenth Amendment. He knew that
the Court had repeatedly held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the Sixth Amendment which
guaranteed to an accused "the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense." He argued with force and persuasion that the
basic difficulty with the Betts6 doctrine is "that no man,
however' 7intelligent, can conduct his own defense adequately.
The Assistant Attorney General of Florida contended
that an overruling of Betts would be an invasion of state's
rights, and emphasized the practical implications of failing
to adhere to the Betts rule. A survey of the Florida prisons
showed that approximately 5,093 of the 7,836 prisoners in
custody at that time were not represented by counsel when
tried. In a letter written to the attorneys general of fortynine states, the State of Florida "invited" them to submit
amicus curiae briefs. One of the most interesting developments of this aspect of the case is the somewhat surprising
fact that twenty-three states did in fact join in an amicus
brief - but took Gideon's side of the case. Only two joined
with Florida.
The story reached its climax on January 19, 1963, when
Gideon's case was argued to a full court. The author gives
us a superbly written account of the interest and concern
shown by the Justices in their questioning of counsel, much
of which is given verbatim, mostly in the form of dialogue.
He dramatically depicts the grandiose setting in which
Gideon's fate was to be decided, and gives a lively account
of the probing interrogation of counsel by the Court. The
end of Gideon's case in the Supreme Court came swiftly.
On March 18, 1963, Justice Black, in concluding his oral
opinion for a unanimous Court, said: "The Court in Betts
v. Brady departed from the sound wisdom upon which the
6 It is worthy of comment to note the analogy presented by the Betts and
Gideon cases. 'Betts was charged with robbery in Carroll County, Maryland,
and asked the court to appoint a lawyer for him 'because he was too poor
to hire one. The trial judge refused on the same ground that the Florida
court denied counsel to Gideon. Betts, who was tried without a jury, was
found guilty and received an eight year sentence. He eventually filed a
petition for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals of Maryland. Chief
Judge Bond reviewed the record of the trial and rejected Betts' claim in
a detailed opinion. The Supreme Court affirmed Judge Bond in a six to
three opinion saying that "want of counsel in a particular case may result
in a conviction lacking . . . in fundamental fairness," but that would
have to be found from the circumstances. In the Betts case, the Supreme
Court relied on the finding of fact by Judge Bond; however, Mr. Lewis
points out the suggestion made by others, that the esteem in which Judge
Bond was held may have influenced the result.
7 LEWIS, at 170.
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Court's holding in Powell v. Alabama rested. Florida, supported by two other states, has asked that Betts v. Brady
be left intact. Twenty-three states, as friends of the Court,
argue that Betts was 'an anachronism when handed down'
and that it should now be overruled. We agree.''8
On August 5, 1963, Gideon was again tried by a jury in
the Circuit Court for Bay County, Florida. The judge who
had presided at Gideon's first trial appointed a local attorney to represent the Defendant. After what appears to have
been a rather routine and colorless proceeding, the jury
returned its verdict of not guilty, after deliberating approximately an hour. Gideon was again a free man, as the
result of one of the most significant decisions in the field
of criminal law of this century.
It has been said that the great rights secured for all of
us by the Bill of Rights are constantly tested and retested
in the courts by the people who "live in the bottom of society's barrel." Whenever there is a fundamental change
in the law, the results may often be spectacular and far
reaching. By January 1, 1964, nine hundred seventy-six
prisoners had been released outright from Florida penitentiaries, the State feeling that they could not be successfully
retried. An additional five hundred were back in court for
retrials, and petitions from hundreds more were awaiting
consideration. On August 10, 1963, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland adopted Rule 719, which provides that indigent
defendants desiring a lawyer must be provided one, if the
crime with which they are charged provides for either a
sentence of imprisonment for six months or more, or a fine
of five hundred dollars or more, or both. This Rule further
provides that counsel need not be appointed where the offense charged is desertion or non-support of wife, children
or destitute parents. On August 20, 1964, President Johnson signed a bill authorizing the payment of fees to courtappointed lawyers for the first time in the federal courts.'
On August 26, 1964, Chief Judge Roszel C. Thomsen of the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland
advised the press that a committee of the United States
Judicial Conference had been appointed to gather information and to make recommendations on the matter of compensating court-appointed counsel. The American Bar Association, at its recent annual meeting in New York, approved the adoption of minimum national standards for
indigent defense programs, including the formation in each
8 Id.

at 189-90.

9 Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 552 (1964).
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of the nation's 3,100 counties of an adequate system for
providing competent counsel for indigent defendants. According to a recent American Bar Association Report,
300,000 persons are charged each year with serious crimes
in state courts, and "at least half of these persons cannot
afford to hire a lawyer to defend them."
The new drive for equal justice, inspired and compelled
by the Gideon case, is consistent with the ideal envisioned
by the late Judge Learned Hand, who many years ago said,
"If we are to keep our democracy, there must be one commandment: Thou shalt not ration justice." The problem
presented by the new drive for equal justice is how 200,000
lawyers in private practice can adequately defend more
than 150,000 indigents a year. The solution is not an easy
one. Due to the well recognized fact that an extremely
high percentage of court-appointed lawyers are unskilled
in criminal law, the advocates of public defender systems
are arguing with increasing fervor that public defenders
should be set up to face public prosecutors throughout the
land to guarantee indigent defendants "an even match in
our adversary system of trial procedures."
Mr. Lewis has authored a superb narrative of justice in
action. He has clearly set in context the history of the
right-to-counsel cases to illustrate how constitutional doctrine develops. He tells the Gideon story from beginning
to end in an informative, exciting and sometimes dramatic
manner. Mr. Lewis has written a splendid book for laymen
without being obscure and for lawyers without being commonplace. Mr. Lewis has made a valuable contribution to
good reading and created a better understanding of the
inner workings of our highest Court.
C.

MAURICE FLINN*

Justice In Moscow. By George Feifer.
Schuster, 1964, Pp. 353. $5.95.

Simon and

Six years ago the Bar Association of Baltimore City
invited the Russian Ambassador to the United States to
speak on the subject of the Soviet legal system. The invitation became a cause celebre. Public protests, pickets,
threatening phone calls and a hastily called special meeting
of the Bar Association to reconsider the invitation followed.
To the protestants, the Soviet Union had a system of rule
* Of the Charles County 'Bar; LL.B. 1946, University of Virginia.
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based on force and terror, not law; hence the Ambassador
could not and should not have anything to say on the latter.1
It is unlikely that either the general public or the Bar
has a different image of Russian law and justice today.
Plays and novels of the Communist scene featuring midnight arrests, Star Chamber interrogations, Siberian labor
camps and secret executions have attracted, as might well
be expected, a much larger audience than the excellent
though technical works of legal scholars which present a
reasoned analysis - and more balanced view - of the
Soviet legal system.2
George Feifer's, Justice in Moscow is the right prescription for our lack of knowledge. Feifer is an American student who in 1959 served as a guide at the American National Exhibition in Moscow and in 1962 returned to
Moscow State University to write a doctoral dissertation
on Soviet criminal theory. In the middle of his studies, he
decided to "sample the pudding, instead of reading the
recipes," and went to court "to find out about socialist
legality in the flesh, not on paper; to seek the ways of living
Russian law and the workings of Soviet justice."3
His findings and conclusions based upon attendance of
hundreds of trials and interviews with countless judges,
lawyers and litigants are skillfully reported in Justice in
Moscow. The reader tours courtroom after courtroom
where the color, human drama and detail of Russian life
mirrored in the trials - unfolds. At the same time, he
is slipped a generous, salutary dosage of legal commentary
which infuses into the narratives of the trials the principles
and philosophy of Soviet law.
Feifer makes clear at the outset one basic ground rule:
the justice he is seeking in the courts of Russia does not
mean justice in terms of constitutional or judicial protection
of political rights, for the power of the Communist Party
in the political sphere is supreme and unchallengable.
Feifer quotes from a textbook on the Soviet judiciary assigned him at Moscow State University:
"The court does not stand and cannot stand beyond
politics, beyond the solution of tasks which face the
1 The invitation was ratified (by a vote of 34-90) and the Ambassador
spoke. For details, see the Baltimore Morning and Evening Sunpapers,
June 10 and 11, 1958.
2Professors Harold J. Berman and John N. Hazard are the leading
authorities. Their basic works are BiMAN, JusTcE IN THE U.S.S.R. (1963
rev. ed.), and HAZARD, THE SOVIET SYSTEM OF GOVEaNMENT (3rd rev.
ed. 1964).
1 FEFERm, at 14.
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state, beyond the direction of the Party. The court is
an active, effective conductor of the policies of the
state,4 a participant in the construction of Communism.,
However, is it not, as Professor Berman suggests, possible
and, from the dictatorship's point of view, desirable to
maintain a system of law which will deal justly with those
relationships between the individual and society or the
state which do not directly involve the power of the state?'
Feifer makes this distinction:
"But the rule of law is not always the same as
justice, and it was the latter that I was looking for. I
was interested not in cases defining the fringes of
political rights, but in all those ordinary cases in the
middle: the daily cases that deal with common crimes
and disputes; the great mass of cases that have nothing
at all to do with state security or idealogical purity.
...
I wanted to know what happens to Ivan, (the
average fellow) when he falls afoul of the law, his
wife, or his boss. 6
Most of the trials reported are in the lower criminal
courts and to the Western observer are a blend of the
familiar and unfamiliar. Many crimes are universal in
character: reckless driving, petty theft, robbery and "hooliganism". But some are indigenous, e.g., "speculation" (the
buying up and resale of goods or other items for the purpose of making a profit) and "exceeding authority" (by a
public official) .7 The trials are public; a judge presides; the
defendant is represented by counsel (in all cases in which
the state procurator appears, which is all but "minor" cases,
the defendant must have counsel); and an indictment is
read.8 There is, however, no jury. Two lay assessors, who
sit for two week terms, flank the judge and have an equal
vote with the judge on both guilt and sentence (in theory
the judge votes last). The proceedings lack both formality
and surprise since the evidence adduced has almost invariably been uncovered by a preliminary investigation. Indeed, Feifer observes that "the trial is a reconstruction not
'Id. at 251.

BERMAN, JUSTICE IN mE U.S.S.R., 8upra note 2, at 372.
6 FEineR, at 15.
7 There Is also the unusual feature that a crime directly against the
state, e.g., theft of state property, carries a stiffer statutory penalty than
the game crime committed against an individual.
8 The case is fully tried even if the defend-ant pleads guilty.
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so much of the crime as of an earlier reconstruction of it." 9
And although defense counsel has the right to crossexamine, there are few defense stratagems as lawyers in
the United States know them. Evidentiary questions are
virtually non-existent.
The judge dominates the trial, and the focus of his attention is not the crime, but the criminal. This is the "whole
man" concept of Soviet justice. The defendant's past life,
personality, family life, work record and community reputation are minutely scrutinized in relation to what a citizen's proper behavior and attitude are supposed to be in
Soviet society. The judge asks a defendant charged with
murder:
"But what was your purpose in life? Isn't it true
that you never gave anything serious attention except
perhaps drink? You switched jobs, you switched interest, you drifted. Where were you headed? What
were you doing to improve yourself and Soviet society?"'10
Another judge says to a defendant charged with violating
passport regulations:
"Young man, you have got to get yourself a job,
you have got to find yourself an honest place in our
socialist society. Young man, you are a fungus. You
have done nothing with your life but practice the
bourgeois creed of getting something for nothing.""
The trial moves inexorably towards a verdict of guilty
and a stiff sentence. Feifer could not recall seeing a single
acquittal, and he described the punishments as "astonishingly severe".
The thread which runs through these seemingly disparate elements of justice and injustice is the political doctrine that the central function of Soviet law is to educate
9 Fsvam, at 86. The preliminary investigation, modeled
on the continental European practice far exceeds in scope and thoroughness American
grand jury proceedings. It includes testimony by witnesses and experts,
an evaluation of the defendant by his colleagues and superiors, and testimony by the defendant (the defendant need not testify at the trial but
must answer questions during the preliminary investigation). The cursory
nature of grand jury proceedings and relative absence of any preliminary
investigation in American procedures is a conspicuous shortcoming since
the investigation may release an obviously innocent man without the
humiliation and expense of a trial and, in any event, apprises the defendant of the details of the case against him. Felfer found little indication
of any violence being used in connection with the investigation.
10
Id. at 264.
11
d. at 67.
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the people to be socially conscious, dedicated members of
society. The task is no less than "the fundamental remaking of the consciousness of the people" so that in time society will discipline itself by the norms of social custom
and conscience. 2 To carry out this task the Soviet judge
lectures with Calvinistic indignation; the "whole man" is
put on trial; Soviet courts sometimes sit in factories or
apartment houses so that the defendant's neighbors can
watch; the infamous "parasite" law" is enforced; and the
unique tradition of the obshchestvennost pervades the legal
system.
The obshchestvennost cannot be exactly translated or
defined. It is most nearly the spirit of the community, the
public but non-governmental institutionalization of the
community. A collective can vote to send a lay member as
a defender or accuser of a defendant in a criminal case, and
this lay member, as obshchestvennik, has the same procedural rights, such as the right to call witnesses, crossexamine and argue, as the procurator or defense attorney
(although as a matter of practice, the obshchestvennik confines his participation to informing the court of the community's opinion of the "whole man"). The obshchestvennost also furnishes a voluntary corps of people's police,
assumes duties of parole over minor offenders, applies
measures of social censure in lieu of other criminal punishments, and conducts the so-called Comradely Courts, or
miniature town meetings, where such antisocial behavior
as truancy from work, drunkenness, insults and swearing
may be punished by small fines and social censure.
The Soviet legal system also educates by swinging a big
stick. A Soviet judge told Feifer: "Everyone must know for
certain that it is futile to break the law - that he has no
chance of getting away with it.' 1 4 The American sporting
theory of justice with its emphasis on rules of evidence and
procedure and the relative skills of advocates (the "modern
American race to beat the law" in Roscoe Pound's phrase)
12 FEnrm, at 333. Feifer quotes a Soviet judge: "Every living person must
be made to understand that society is i8, that to rob his neighbor is to rob
himself." Id. at 330. (The echo is James Baldwin.)
Professor Berman terms iSoviet law "parental": "The Soviet citizen
is considered to be a member of a growing, unfinished, still immature
society, which is moving towards a new and higher plan of development. As a subject of law, or litigant in court, he is like a child or
youth to be trained, guided, disciplined, directed. The judge plays the
part of a parent or guardian .... " BERMAN, Op. Cit. supra note 2, at 284.
12 Persons considered to be '"avoiding socially useful work and leading an
antisocial parasitic way of life" can be tried and banished from their community without most of the protections of criminal procedure.
1, ]Fi:R, at 330.
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has no place in the Soviet system. The overriding consideration in any individual case is not the rights of the individual but the higher and greater good of a reformed mankind. 5
Feifer concludes that the ambitions and goals of the
Soviet legal system are loftier and "more shining" than
Western ones and therefore, since we do not know for sure
whether the Russians will attain them, a final decision on
Russian justice, which serves those ambitions and goals,
must be reserved. That decision must be remanded to another generation, or to the generation after that, for further evidence. "Is it fair (he asks) to taste the pudding
while it is still cooking?"'16
The immense worth of Justice in Moscow is not to be
measured, however, by the weight of the author's legal
excursions or conclusions. Feifer is not an attorney, and
his book is not a working text for those who wish to be informed in depth on the Russian legal system and reach
their own conclusions on it vis a vis justice in the United
States." But it is more than enough that Justicein Moscow
is an absorbing readable primer which begins to clear away
our distorted images of the Soviet system so that upon the
bedrock of a true understanding of that system, we can
proceed to challenge its assertions.
KALMAN R. HETTLEVAN*
15Many of the critics of the Supreme Court's recent opinions in the area
of civil liberties will no doubt be dismayed to find themselves arguing more
or less like Russian jurists.
16 saF a, at 335.
'1 Feifer is at his best in the colorful narratives of the trials, at his
next
best on Soviet legal practices and theory, and at his blatant worst in
references to law in the United States. It is unfortunate that he has
thought It necessary to gloss his picture of Russia "as a reasonably normal,
progressive, content and happy place to live (Saturday Review of Literature, 47:27, 28, June 27, 1964)" with the uniformly uninformed and hyperbolic criticisms of criminal procedure in the United States which appear
throughout the book. In the process, he has underestimated the persuasiveness of the picture of Russian life and has painted and flavored it.
* Member, Maryland 'Bar; 'B.A. 1955, Duke University; LL.B. 1962,
University of Maryland.

